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Abstract
This paper examines whether firms' deviation from target leverage may predict
types and outcomes of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) deals. We find that
over-levered firms are more inclined to be involved in public acquisitions than
non-public acquisitions. Consistent with the proposition of information eco-
nomics theory, our findings suggest that information asymmetry is the main
motive behind over-levered firms' preference for public targets. Specifically, we
observe that over-levered acquirers not only prefer public targets, but also pick
those with less information asymmetry. We find that, in the short term, the
market reacts negatively to the announcement of public acquisitions by over-
levered firms. However, in the long term these acquirers experience better
operating synergies and values, measured by changes in return on assets and
Tobin's q, respectively. Our results are robust after controlling for M&A deals-,
firm-, industry-characteristics and endogeneity concerns using both propensity
score matching and Heckman two stage methods. Overall, our findings sup-
port the premises of agency theory and Uysal, Journal of Financial Economics
(2011), 102, 602–620 view that over-levered firms have a high tendency to pur-
sue most value-enhancing acquisition deals due to the high pressure of holding
high levels of debt.
KEYWORD S
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Trade-off theory holds that a firm's target leverage is
determined by balancing tax shield benefits and bank-
ruptcy frictions (Bradley, Jarrell, & Kim, 1984;
Miller, 1977). Agency theory advocates that target lever-
age level is set to mitigate agency costs between managers
and shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977;
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Stulz, 1990). Brounen, De Jong, and Koedijk (2006) report
that 67% of the chief financial officers from the UK, the
Netherlands and Germany seek to keep their leverage
level around target.1 Nevertheless, many firms deviate
from their targets as a result of various factors, including
information asymmetries, market inefficiencies and
transaction costs (Bradley et al., 1984; Leary & Rob-
erts, 2005; Miller, 1977).
According to Morellec and Zhdanov (2008) the con-
nection between a firm's leverage deviation as a source of
new finance and subsequent mergers and acquisitions
(M&A) investment decisions is clear, but few studies
have investigated this link.2 In particular, firms that hold
leverage above their target (henceforth “over-levered
firms”) are exposed to high financial distress costs that
generally impede their ability to raise capital and to issue
new debt (Dang, Kim, & Shin, 2012; Kayhan & Tit-
man, 2007). The debt constraints of over-levered firms
restrict their ability to finance large acquisitions with
debt (Harford, Klasa, & Walcott, 2009). These firms also
lose takeover bidding contests due to their unfavourable
financial conditions (Morellec & Zhdanov, 2008).
Uysal (2011) documents that the high costs associated
with raising finance from external capital markets reduce
over-levered firms' intentions to engage in acquisition
deals. Thus, this paper extends previous literature by
investigating over-levered firms' choices between public
and non-public acquisitions. It further explores the
motives and outcomes for such choices.
Over-levered firms' choice between public and non-pub-
lic acquisitions can be explained by the premises of infor-
mation economics theory, which views information
asymmetry as a risk (Barney, 1986; Capron & Shen, 2007;
Makadok & Barney, 2001). Non-public acquisitions are
exposed to substantially greater information asymmetry
regarding their value than public acquisition deals are (Offi-
cer, Poulsen, & Stegemoller, 2009). The relaxed disclosure
requirements of non-public firms trigger substantial
increases in information asymmetry about the fairness their
values (Officer et al., 2009). Furthermore, the UK Compa-
nies Act 2006 exempts small and medium-sized non-public
firms from filing audited accounts and from reporting their
cash flows. In contrast, the IPO process, stringent regulatory
disclosure requirements, analysts, the stock market and
press coverage increase the quality and quantity of informa-
tion on public targets that is available (Officer et al., 2009).
In brief, consistent with information economics theory,
over-levered firms that face higher financial risk are moti-
vated to engage in public acquisitions in order to avoid any
additional risk of information asymmetry about the fair
values of non-public targets.
We further examine the short- and long-term effects
of these acquisition deals on over-levered acquirers.
Consistent with the efficient market hypothesis, we
expect that the market perception of the quality of pub-
lic acquisitions by over-levered firms depends on
whether the main motive is only to avoid information
asymmetry regarding non-public targets or further to
include post-acquisition synergies and values.
According to agency theory, over-levered firms are
heavily committed to future interest payments; thus,
they are motivated to improve future performance due
to the fear of losing their jobs in case of default (Berger
& Di Patti, 2006). Further, if they are willing to make
an acquisition, they are likely to be selective and
choose the best wealth-gain deals (Uysal, 2011; Ahmed
& Elshandidy, 2018). Hence, this paper addresses the
gap in the literature by examining the effect of public
acquisition on over-levered firms' performance and
values in a sample of all the completed M&A deals by
UK public acquirers from 1987 to 2016.3
We observe that over-levered firms are more often
involved than non-public acquisitions in public acquisi-
tions. Additionally, over-levered firms prefer the public
targets with less risk of information asymmetry. We
show, using short-event windows of 3 and 5 days, that
the market perceives the announcement of public acqui-
sitions by over-levered firms as bad investments. In par-
ticular, we find that over-levered acquirers of public
targets experience negative cumulative abnormal returns
(CARs) around the announcement of these deals. How-
ever, using changes in the operating performance in the
3 years' before and 3 years after the effective year of pub-
lic acquisition, we find that public acquisitions induce
better operating synergies for over-levered firms. Simi-
larly, we find that in the long run public acquisitions
enhance over-levered firms' values measured by changes
in Tobin's q in the 3 years' post and pre the effective year
of completed deals. Our results are robust after control-
ling for self-selection bias and endogeneity concerns
using both propensity score matching (PSM) and Heck-
man-two stage methods.
Our empirical results contribute to a strand of litera-
ture on the interaction between capital structure and
acquisition decisions (i.e., Harford et al., 2009;
Uysal, 2011) by exploring the link between the position
of corporate leverage deviation and some types of acquisi-
tion. This paper is thought to be one of the first to present
the interesting insight that firms take into account their
target leverage when they choose between public and
non-public acquisitions. Specifically, we provide novel
evidence that over-levered firms prefer not only to pursue
public acquisitions, but also to choose those with less risk
of information asymmetry. Lending support to informa-
tion economics theory, these findings suggest that infor-
mation asymmetry avoidance can be one of the motives
2 AHMED AND ELSHANDIDY
behind decisions by over-levered firms to acquire public
targets.
This paper further articulates the link between lever-
age deviation and the outcomes of acquisition deals. In
particular, it adds to the literature by investigating mar-
ket participants' short-term reactions to the announce-
ment by over-levered firms of pubic and non-public
acquisitions. It notes that over-levered acquirers of public
targets experience a negative market reaction. This sug-
gests that the market reaction to the announcement of an
acquisition may be affected by external investors' percep-
tion of the main motive beyond the deal. Arguably, the
market may view the announcement of public acquisi-
tions by over-levered firms as a decision that is inspired
only by the firms' incentive to avoid information asym-
metry and not so much by a concern to maximize share-
holders' wealth.
Contradicting our empirical findings of market reac-
tion and the conventional view that public acquisitions
destroy the value of shareholders' wealth with respect to
non-public acquisitions (i.e., Faccio, McConnell, &
Stolin, 2006; Fuller, Netter, & Stegemoller, 2002), our
findings provide novel evidence that over-levered firms
experience value creation and better performance in the
long run following the acquisition of public targets. These
findings confirm that the leverage deviation position of
an acquirer is a core determinant of long-term post-
acquisition value and performance. Overall, these find-
ings support the premises of the agency theory and
Uysal's (2011) view that over-levered firms that are more
heavily committed to meet debt-payment terms are likely
to be involved in wealth-gain acquisition decisions. Spe-
cifically, we provide novel evidence that over-levered
firms carefully choose public acquisitions deals that
induce better operating synergies and value maximiza-
tion in the long run.
In addition to previous contributions to knowledge,
this paper has direct implications for both theory and
practise. First, with regard to theory, our contradictory
results concerning short-term market reaction and the
long-term effect of public acquisitions on the value of
over-levered firms, assume that it may be a questionable
notion that the UK stock market is rational in pricing
new information such as announcements of acquisitions.
However, these findings support the premises of the
agency theory, that holding leverage above target lever-
age can be an effective means of reducing the agency cost
between managers and shareholders. Second, from the
practitioners' point of view, and contrary to findings in
the prior literature (i.e., Erel et al., 2015; Moeller,
Schlingemann, & Stulz, 2004; Uysal, 2011) which have
treated all acquisitions as a single homogeneous group,
the results of this paper suggest that distinguishing
between public and non-public acquisitions is essential,
since each type has its own characteristics, drivers and
economic consequences. Similarly, as regards heteroge-
neity in firms' leverage deviations, it may be crucial to
determine if they have leverage above the target. Specifi-
cally, our findings confirm that over-levered firms have
special characteristics that not only drive their acquisi-
tion choices, but also significantly affect the economic
gains from such investment deals. Identifying the eco-
nomic gains of over-levered firms following public versus
non-public acquisitions will enable managers to develop
strategic plans for better acquisition decisions. It also
may enable policy makers to develop codes of best prac-
tise by which to assess whether managers are behaving in
compliance with their fiduciary responsibilities, as
defined in company laws.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
reviews the literature Section 3 describes our sample,
main independent variables and empirical models. Sec-
tion 4 presents our empirical findings, Section 5 describes
further robustness tests, and Section 6 outlines our
conclusions.
2 | LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 | Over-levered firms' choice between
public and non-public acquisitions
Both trade-off and agency theories assume that firms
have target leverage that they are striving to maintain
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977; Stulz, 1990). Pre-
vious studies (i.e., Hovakimian et al., 2001; Morellec &
Zhdanov, 2008; Uysal, 2011) document that deviation
from target leverage significantly affects firms' behav-
iours, choices and decisions. Specifically, leverage devia-
tion influences corporate behaviours and decisions,
including those on issuing debt (Hovakimian et al., 2001),
financing acquisitions (Uysal, 2011) and setting bidding
limits in takeover contests (Morellec & Zhdanov, 2008).
These studies also confirm that the leverage deviation
effect on corporate behaviours and decisions is mainly
driven by over-levered firms. Agency theory argues that
over-levered firms suffer from a high risk of liquidation
and high pressure to service their debt (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976). Accordingly, over-levered firms' choices
between public or non-public acquisitions can be
explained by over-levered firms' appetite for the risk of
information asymmetry.
Officer (2007) argues that the information asymmetry
problem is associated with M&A deals of all types; how-
ever, this problem is substantially more severe for non-
public targets than public targets. In particular, the
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relaxed disclosure requirements of non-public firms may
reduce the quality and quantity of information which, in
turn, limits the breadth of a bidder's search and increases
the uncertainties in the proper evaluation of these kinds
of investment (Officer et al., 2009; Reuer &
Ragozzino, 2008). Furthermore, according to the UK
Companies Act 2006, small and medium-sized non-pub-
lic firms are exempted from filing audited accounts and
from reporting their cash flows. It also allows them to
lodge abbreviated accounts. Thus, non-public targets are
more opaque than publicly-traded targets. However, the
regulatory disclosure requirements, auditors' and ana-
lysts' coverage and associations with investment banks
enhance the visibility of public targets and minimize
uncertainties about their fair value. Those targets are also
priced by the stock market (Capron & Shen, 2007). Thus,
consistent with the information economics theory, infor-
mation asymmetry around non-public acquisitions can
be viewed as a friction in the factor markets that
increases uncertainty about their value and makes them
more opaque than public targets (Capron & Shen, 2007).
Based on this discussion, our assumption is that,
motivated by risk of information asymmetry, over-levered
firms that are exposed to higher risks of default will pre-
fer public acquisitions in order to avoid any additional
risk arising from acquiring mis-evaluated non-public tar-
gets. This leads to the following two sub-hypotheses:
H1 Over-levered firms are likely to acquire public targets
rather than non-public targets.
H2 Over-levered firms are likely to acquire public targets
with lower information asymmetry.
2.2 | Market reaction to over-levered
firms' announcement of public versus non-
public acquisitions
Motivated by information economics, our previous expec-
tations suggest that over-levered firms are more likely to
choose public targets than non-public targets, and among
those public targets, over-levered firms are more inclined
to select those with less information asymmetry.
According to the efficient market theory, stock investors
respond accurately and instantaneously to new informa-
tion, including announcements of acquisitions deals
(Fama, 1991). Thus, this section develops the discussion
to question whether the market is going to react either
positively or negatively to the announcement of public
and non-public acquisitions by over-levered firms.
Prior literature documents that non-public acquisi-
tions experience superior gains to those of public
acquisitions (i.e., Faccio et al., 2006; Fuller et al., 2002;
Moeller et al., 2004). Arguably, the efficient market the-
ory advocates that no bidder can gain above-normal
returns from the market by trading on publicly-available
information (Fama, 1991). In particular, bidders acquire
similar information on public targets that ultimately
drives them to invest in and compete for the same ones.
This competition for the same public target would
increase prices and reduce bidders' returns to zero
(Capron & Shen, 2007).
However, strategic factor market theory argues that
information heterogeneity among potential bidders for
non-public targets can be viewed as a source of value cre-
ation to the bidders (Makadok & Barney, 2001). Specifi-
cally, the non-public acquisition process may allow the
release of private information between bidder and target,
which is impossible in contested public acquisitions
(Conn, Cosh, Guest, & Hughes, 2005). Fuller et al. (2002)
report that firms experience, on average, 2.08 and 2.75%
abnormal returns when buying private or subsidiary tar-
gets, respectively. They also experience a 1% stock loss
when acquiring a public target. Faccio et al. (2006) find
that, on average, bidders earn 1.48% CARs when under-
taking non-public acquisitions and an insignificant
−0.38% CAR when making public acquisitions. Further-
more, a liquidation effect provides another explanation of
acquirers' gains from non-public acquisitions. Specifi-
cally, non-public targets cannot be traded as easily as
public targets, and the latter also have the alternative of
cashing out their shares in the market rather than being
acquired (Capron & Shen, 2007). Officer (2007) reports
that non-public firms are sold with an average discount
of 15% to 30% compared to their public counterparts,
owing to the value of providing liquidity to owners of
non-public targets: “Here, the acquirer pays a lower acqui-
sition premium to compensate for the illiquidity of the
asset, to compensate for the opacity of the target, and
because the unlisted target takes liquidity as a form of
nonpecuniary payment” (Harford, Humphery-Jenner, &
Powell, 2012, p.249).
In brief, prior literature documents that public acquisi-
tions entail wealth loss. However, motivated by information
economics theory, over-levered firms are more likely to
choose public acquisitions to avoid the high information
asymmetry associated with pursuing non-public acquisi-
tions. Thus, we expect market participants to view the
announcements of public acquisitions by over-levered firms
as bad investments, if these participants believe that over-
levered firms, rather than receiving potential post-acquisi-
tion synergies and value, engage in such acquisitions merely
to avoid the risk of information asymmetry.
The other competing argument, which stems from
the agency theory perspective, posits that firms should
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increase their leverage level in order to minimize conflict
between shareholders and managers by restricting mana-
gerial discretion over future free cash flows (FCFs)
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977; Stulz, 1990).
Accordingly, over-levered firms are more heavily com-
mitted to future interest and principal payments. They
are exposed to high pressures arising from a high risk of
default. Thus, managers of over-levered firms are moti-
vated to improve the future performance of their firms
due to the fear of losing their jobs in case of default (Ber-
ger & Di Patti, 2006). Consistently, Uysal (2011) provides
empirical evidence that over-levered firms are more
likely to be selective and choose the most value-creating
acquisition deal. He reports that over-levered firms have
positive and significant CAR around the announcement
of an acquisition transaction. In brief, we expect that the
market is likely to react positively to the announcement
of public acquisitions, since over-levered firms normally
experience high pressure from inherent risks. Thus, it is
expected that these firms are likely to select the best pub-
lic targets, and, therefore, the market will recognize their
selection by pricing these deals.
Based on the previous discussion and given the two
competing arguments, we formulate the following unidi-
rectional hypothesis:
H3 The market is likely to react (either positively or nega-
tively) to the announcement of public acquisitions by
over-levered firms.
2.3 | The impact of public versus non-
public acquisitions on the long-term
performance and value of over-levered
firms
After exploring the market reaction to over-levered
firms' decision to make public acquisitions, we should
next investigate the impact of these deals on their long-
term performance and value. The market reaction to
the announcement of M&A deals is observed within a
short period, and thus the market may misprice deals,
as opposed to its value-added within a longer time
horizon. Thus, our paper observes the long-term oper-
ating performance and value of over-levered firms that
acquire public targets. If these deals carry a real value
to shareholders, then the rationale behind over-levered
firms' decisions to have public acquisitions can be justi-
fied. In contrast, if these deals diminish the operating
performance and value of over-levered firms, this may
reflect the immaturity of over-levered firms in deciding
whether to choose between public and non-public
targets.
Consistent with information economics theory, over-
levered firms' choice of public acquisitions over non-pub-
lic acquisitions may be motivated by their preference for
avoiding any additional risk of information asymmetry.
However, imperfect information around non-public
acquisitions can be viewed as a source of value creation
to acquiring firms (Makadok & Barney, 2001). Agency
theory advocates that holding leverage above the target
can minimize agency costs and encourage managers to
act more in the interests of shareholders by investing in
acquisition deals that gain wealth (Jensen & Meckling,
1976). In particular, over-levered firms are exposed to a
higher risk of liquidation that provides managerial disci-
pline through the threat of losing a manager's reputation
and job in case of default (William & Michael, 1976).
Over-levered firms are also under great pressure to make
value-enhancing investments that generate enough cash
flow to cover the payment of interest (Jensen, 1986).
Empirically, Margaritis and Psillaki (2010) find that firms
with leverage above the target take investment decisions
that maximize firms' value and performance. Uysal (2011)
and Maloney, McCormick, and Mitchell (1993) show that
over-levered firms outperform others players in the
acquisition market.
Based on the previous discussion and following
assumptions of both agency and information economics
theories, we formulate the following hypotheses:
H4 Public acquisitions enhance over-levered firms' long-
term performance.
H5 Public acquisitions enhance over-levered firms' long-
term value.
3 | METHODOLOGY
3.1 | Sample
Our sample comprises all completed M&A deals by UK
public firms, downloaded from the Thomson One data-
base for the period January 1, 1987 to December 31, 2016.
According to Antoniou, Petmezas, and Zhao (2007), data
coverage on UK M&A deals before 1987 was very limited.
The sample period ends in 2016, since our analysis
requires at least 3 years of post-merger performance data
from the effective year of M&A deals (i.e., Bhaumik &
Selarka, 2012; Dutta & Jog, 2009). Thus, financial data of
all UK listed firms are downloaded from the Eikon data-
base between 1984 and 2019.
Following Barbopoulos, Paudyal, and Pescetto (2012),
Harford et al. (2009), Ahmed and Elshandidy (2016) and
Conn et al. (2005), our sample includes all M&A deals
AHMED AND ELSHANDIDY 5
that meet the following criteria: deals are completed; the
acquirer is a public UK firm; the acquirer is not from a
financial (SIC 6,000–6,999) or utilities (SIC 4,900–4,999)
industry, since they are different in nature from other
industries and are subject to different regulatory and
accounting requirements (Ozkan, 2001); the target can be
a public, private or subsidiary firm; the target can be
either a domestic or a foreign firm4; acquirers should take
over absolute control of more than 50% of the targets; the
payment method should be cash, stock or a combination
of these; a cut-off point of a minimum deal value of one
million dollars is employed, to avoid the results being
affected by very small deals (Uysal, 2011); and all deals
labelled minority stake purchases, acquisitions of
remaining interest, privatizations, leveraged buyouts, spi-
noffs, recapitalisations, self-tenders or exchange offers
and repurchases are excluded (Alexandridis, Fuller,
Terhaar, & Travlos, 2013). Accordingly, the final sample
comprises 6,182 successful acquisition deals.
3.2 | Estimation of leverage deviation
and over-levered firms
Following Uysal (2011), leverage deviation is measured
as actual market leverage minus target leverage. Actual
market leverage ratio is total debt divided by the sum of
total debt plus the market value of equity (Harford
et al., 2009). Target leverage is estimated using all the
financial data of UK listed firms from 1984 to 2019.5 Spe-
cifically, we run yearly-industry regressions of market
leverage ratios on lagged values of the main determinants
of capital structure (Harford et al., 2009; Uysal, 2011). We
employ ROA (return on assets) ratio, firm size, non-debt
tax shield (NDTS), market to book (MTB) ratio, asset tan-
gibility, liquidity ratio, research and development (R&D)
over total assets, R&D missing and selling expenses over
sales as the main determinants of capital structure
(Céspedes, González, & Molina, 2010; Dang, 2013;
Ozkan, 2001; Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Uysal, 2011).6
The ROA variable is a proxy for a firm's past profit-
ability. Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that firms would
rather raise capital from retained earnings than from
external sources of finance. Thus, profitable firms with
sufficient retained earnings will rely less on issuing debt
to finance future projects (Dang, 2013; Fama &
French, 2002). However, trade-off theory expects that
profitable firms may increase their leverage to maximize
their debt induced tax shield (Antoniou, Guney, &
Paudyal, 2008). The firm size variable is included because
large firms are more diversified and may have more sta-
ble cash flows than small firms (Titman & Wessels, 1988).
Accordingly, consistent with trade-off theory, large firms
are exposed to a lower risk of default and can expand
their leverage level at more favourable interest rates than
small firms can (Ozkan, 2001). MTB controls for firm
growth opportunities, which are intangible in nature and
valuable as long as a firm exists; however, they have lim-
ited collateral value if the firm becomes insolvent (Tit-
man & Wessels, 1988). Thus, following both trade-off and
agency theories, lenders view firms with more growth
options as risky investments and seek higher compensa-
tion (Harris & Raviv, 1991). In contrast, tangible assets
may preserve their market value more than intangible
assets, and thus may be used as collateral for debt in case
of liquidation (Antoniou et al., 2008). Collateral debt may
also restrict a firm's ability to engage in asset substitution
and risk-shifting activities, thus reducing the agency costs
of debt (Titman & Wessels, 1988; Harris & Raviv, 1991;
Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Accordingly, creditors accept
lower premiums from firms with high tangible assets.
Trade-off theory states that most firms use debt in order
to reap tax deduction advantages (Miller, 1977). NDTS,
such as depreciation, amortiszation and investment tax
credits, may replace the tax deduction benefits associated
with using debt which, in turn, reduce a firm's motiva-
tion to acquire more debt (DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980).
Furthermore, firms with a high liquidity ratio may
employ liquid assets such as accumulated cash to fund
their investments, rather than issuing further debt
(Ozkan, 2001). Harford et al. (2009) employ the R&D
over sales ratio to account for firms' growth opportuni-
ties. They also control for product uniqueness using a
variable of selling expenses over sales. Uysal (2011) cre-
ates a binary variable that equals one for any missing
observations of the R&D variable and zero otherwise.
Appendix B reports the time series means of coefficient
estimates of yearly-industry regressions employed to predict
target leverage of UK non-financial public firms. It finds,
consistent with the prior literature (Dang, 2013; Ozkan,
2001), that ROA, MTB, NDTS, R&D expenses/total assets
and liquidity variables have negative association with target
market leverage. In contrast, firm size, asset tangibility and
R&D missing variables have a positive significant associa-
tion with the estimated target leverage. These results are in
line with the prior literature in the UK context (e.g.,
Dang, 2013; Ozkan, 2001).
The fitted value of previous recursive regressions
across each industry-year subgroup represents the target
leverage ratio. We deduct the target leverage ratio of each
firm from its actual leverage ratio to calculate its leverage
deviation proxy. Then, we rank all firms in each year by
their leverage deviation and select the top quintile as a
proxy of over-levered firms.
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3.3 | Empirical models
We use an over-levered variable estimated in the previous
section to examine its effect on the probability of pursu-
ing public acquisitions. To address this question, we run
the following logit model [Equation (1)] and tobit model
[Equation (2)] to test H1.
P public acquisition= 1ð Þ
=Φ β0 + β1over− leveredi,t−1 +
X
βiControlsi,t−1
 
ð1Þ
Public value=TA= β0 + βover− leveredi, t−1
+
X
βicontrolsi, t−1 + εi, t
ð2Þ
We employ a logit model in Equation (1), since the
dependent variable (public acquisition) is a dummy vari-
able that takes the value one if a firm makes a public
acquisition and zero if it makes a non-public acquisition.
Following Officer (2007), both private and subsidiary tar-
gets are classified as non-public acquisitions. According
to Thomson One database, ‘subsidiary’ represents acquir-
ing firms that are subsidiaries of target firms. Since there
is no public information available about both private and
subsidiary targets, these deals are classified as non-public
M&A deals (Fuller et al., 2002). We adopt a tobit model
in Equation (2) because the dependent variable, being
the ratio of public M&A deals value to acquirers' total
assets, is censored at zero (Uysal, 2011).
Over-levered and other explanatory variables in both
models are estimated a year before the announcement
year of firms' M&A deals. In Equations (1) and (2), we
control for firm size, MTB, ROA, stock return, asset tan-
gibility, liquidity, sales growth, FCF, firm life cycle and
market leverage (Roll, 1986; Harford et al., 2009; Owen &
Yawson, 2010; Uysal, 2011). Consistent with Harford
et al. (2009), it is essential to control for market leverage
in order to ease interpretation and disentangle its effect
from that of the over-levered variable. Controlling for
market leverage also confirms that the over-levered vari-
able is not a proxy for pre-acquisition market leverage
but simply estimates the deviation effect. We also control
for industry concentration using Herfindahl index
(Uysal, 2011). We use the industry M&A liquidity index
to capture corporate asset liquidity in each industry
(Schlingemann, Stulz, & Walkling, 2002). Fama and
French's 12-industry classification is also employed to
account for the industry effect. Finally, the year fixed
effect is used to capture macroeconomic changes in the
time series.
Then, we extend our analysis to see whether over-
levered firms are more inclined to acquire public targets
with lower information asymmetry, using the following
logit model.
P public target with lower information asymmetry = 1ð Þ
=Φ β0 + β1over− leveredi,t−1 +
X
βiControlsi,t−1
  ð3Þ
Borochin, Ghosh, and Huang (2019) argue that one
key reason for the divergence in information asymmetry
findings in the M&A literature is that most empirical
papers use one proxy to capture the level of information
asymmetry. For this reason, in Equation (3), we employ
four different binary dependent variables to test H2.
Karpoff, Lee, and Masulis (2013) and Frankel and
Li (2004) argue that large firms receive more attention
from the external market, which minimizes the risk of
information asymmetry. Thus, our first dependent vari-
able is the large public target variable that takes the value
one if a firm acquires a public target with a size above
the yearly average of all targets in the sample, and zero
otherwise. Leary and Roberts (2010) show that firms with
higher tangible assets are much easier to value, which in
turn reduces the information asymmetry between insider
and outsider players. Thus, the second dependent vari-
able, public targets with higher tangible assets, takes the
value one if a firm acquires a public target with tangible
assets above the yearly-average of all targets in the sam-
ple, and zero otherwise. Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006)
and Karpoff et al. (2013) find that firms with less return
volatility are likely to have less noisy information about
their values and performance. Return volatility is defined
as the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the
year before the announcement year of an acquisition
(Karpoff et al., 2013). Consequently, the third dependent
variable, which takes the value one if a firm acquires a
public target with return volatility below the yearly-aver-
age of all targets in the sample, and zero otherwise, is
public targets with lower return volatility. Amihud (2002)
defends the view that firms with more frequently traded
stocks will face less information asymmetry about their
fair values. He measures the frequency of traded stock in
his Amihud index, which equals the average of absolute
value of the daily stock return divided by trading volume
over the year before the announcement year of an acqui-
sition. Therefore, our fourth dependent variable in cap-
turing information asymmetry is public targets with
more frequently traded stocks'; it takes the value one if a
firm acquires a public target under the Amihud index
below the yearly average of all the targets in the sample,
and zero otherwise.
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Next, we run an event study to investigate how the
market reacts to the announcement of public acquisitions
by over-levered firms using an interaction variable,
namely, Over-levered× Public acquisitions. Then, we
employ the following ordinary least squares (OLS) regres-
sion model to test H3.
CAR= β0 + β1Over− levered×Public acquisitionsi,j,t−1
+
X
βiControlsi,j,t−1 + εi,j,t
ð4Þ
CAR is cumulative abnormal returns over a 3-day
event window (from 1 day before to 1 day after the
announcement date) and over a 5-day event window
(2 days before and 2 days after the announcement date).7
CAR is estimated using the market adjusted model
(MAM) and the market model (MM). The benchmark
return is the Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) all
shares index of firms listed in the London Stock of
Exchange. MM parameters are estimated over a 255-day
window that ends 46 trading days before the announce-
ment date of M&A transactions (Jansen, 2015).
In addition to the control variables that we used in
the previous three equations, we add M&A deal charac-
teristics variables, namely, deals' relative size, competed
deals, hostile deals, stock acquisition deals and cash
acquisition deals (Officer, 2003; Uysal, 2011).
Finally, we run the following OLS models to explore
the effect of public acquisitions on long-term perfor-
mance and value of over-levered acquirers to test H4
and H5.
ΔROA= β0 + β1Over− levered× Public acquisitionsi,j,t−1
+
X
βicontrolsi,t−1 + εi,t
ð5Þ
ΔTobin0sq= β0 + β1Over− levered× Public acquisitionsi,j,t−1
+
X
βicontrolsi,t−1 + εi,t
ð6Þ
Following Ma, Sun, Waisman, and Zhu (2016), the
change in ROA variable in Equation (5) is measured as
the acquirer's average ROA in the 3-year post-acquisi-
tions period minus average ROA in the 3-year pre-acqui-
sition period from the effective year of a completed deal.
The change in Tobin's q variable in Equation (6) is mea-
sured as the acquirer's average Tobin's q in the 3-year
post-acquisitions period minus average Tobin's q in 3-
year pre-acquisition period from the effective year of a
completed deal.8
Before running the previous empirical models, we
examine the issue of multicollinearity between the
explanatory variables. We run the mean variance
inflation factor (VIF) test for each regression model. The
results reveal that the mean VIF for our explanatory vari-
ables range between 1.08 and 2.28, indicating that
multicollinearity does not exist (Gujarati & Porter, 2009).
Furthermore, to avoid the impact of outliers, all continu-
ous variables in the empirical models are winsorised at
the first and 99th percentiles (Ahmed & Elshandidy, 2016;
Uysal, 2011).
4 | EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
4.1 | Descriptive statistics
Panel A of Table 1 presents summary statistics for main
variables of the empirical models that are discussed in
the previous section. It shows that, over the sample
period of 30 years from 1987 to 2016, around 8% of UK
public firms were involved in public acquisitions and
around 92% engaged in non-public acquisitions (differ-
ences on deal characteristics between these targets are
given in Panel B of Table 1). Over the same period of
study, 13.2% were classified as over-levered firms. This
supports the view of Davydenko and Franks (2008) that
strict UK bankruptcy codes UK firms to hold a market
leverage ratio near the target. Consistent with Antoniou
et al. (2008), market leverage constitutes on average
15.6% of UK firms' capital structure mix. The ROA shows
that UK public firms generate on average 10.3% profit
before tax and interest on their total assets. The average
firm size of UK non-financial acquirers equals 11.8, mea-
sured as the natural logarithm of sales. The MTB, consis-
tent with Guney, Ozkan, and Ozkan (2007), indicates
that, on average, the market value of UK public firms
exceeds 1.5 times their book value. The variables that
indicate the economic consequences of acquisition deals
reveal that UK public firms, after engaging in an acquisi-
tion, experience on average, a 0.5% increase in the
changes of ROA, as a measure of operating performance.
However, these firms have a 0.004 reduction, on average,
in the mean value of the changes in Tobin's q around
their acquisition deals.
Panel B shows the main differences on deal character-
istics between public targets (472 deals) and non-public
targets (5,710 deals). The results, based on a t-test, show
that there are significant differences in CARs, deal rela-
tive size, completed deals, hostile deals, and pure stock
deals, at the 1% level. The panel shows that while the
market reaction to acquisition deals for public targets is
negative, the observed reaction to non-public targets is
positive, and there is a significant difference between
these two target types in this reaction. It shows also that
public targets have significantly higher deal relative sizes,
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completed deals, and hostile deals than non-public tar-
gets. The panel reports that public targets use pure stock
to finance acquisition deals (27.3%) significantly higher
than non-public targets (5%). However, both target types
rely similarly (there no statistical difference) on pure cash
to finance these acquisition deals.
TABLE 1 Summary statistics
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of full sample.
Variables N. Mean Median SD Min. Max.
Public acquisitions 6,182 0.076 0.000 0.266 0.000 1.000
Over-levered 6,182 0.132 0.000 0.339 0.000 1.000
ROA 6,182 0.103 0.135 0.249 −2.629 0.453
Firm size 6,182 11.763 11.681 2.006 4.787 16.503
MTB 6,182 1.500 1.014 1.849 0.054 16.715
Market leverage 6,182 0.156 0.129 0.146 0.000 0.625
Stock return 6,182 17.763 13.720 41.953 −68.01 105.71
Herfindahl index 6,182 0.116 0.072 0.144 0.019 0.861
Industry liquidity 6,182 0.054 0.026 0.135 0.000 2.009
Public value/TA 6,182 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.013
Asset tangibility 5,773 0.248 0.197 0.219 0.000 0.936
Liquidity 5,773 1.677 1.324 2.007 0.070 56.800
Firm growth 5,773 0.282 0.151 0.442 −0.573 1.598
FCF 5,773 0.063 0.039 1.225 −11.688 1.735
Firm life cycle 5,773 0.117 0.411 2.993 −26.280 17.826
Δ ROA 3,279 0.005 −0.004 0.147 −0.284 0.298
Δ Tobin's q 3,008 −0.044 0.144 1.604 −4.718 3.509
Public targets with
Large size 5,596 0.041 0.000 0.199 0.000 1.000
Higher fixed assets 5,596 0.038 0.000 0.191 0.000 1.000
Lower return volatility 5,596 0.026 0.000 0.160 0.000 1.000
More freq. Traded stocks 5,596 0.007 0.000 0.058 0.000 1.000
Panel B: Difference in means between public and non-public targets
Variables
Public targets Non-public targets Difference
Mean Mean t-value
CARMM (−1,+1) −0.006 0.013 −0.019***
CARMM (−2,+2) −0.007 0.014 −0.021***
CARMAM (−1,+1) −0.004 0.015 −0.019***
CARMAM (−2,+2) −0.003 0.017 −0.020***
Deal relative size 0.386 0.167 0.219***
Competed deals 0.074 0.001 0.073***
Hostile deals 0.028 0.000 0.028***
Pure stock deals 0.273 0.050 0.223***
Pure cash deals 0.479 0.486 −0.007
N 472 5,710
Note: This table gives descriptive statistics of the sample as follows. Panel A reports summary statistics of the main variables used in the
paper. Panel B reports t-tests on the statistical difference in means for deal characteristics between public and non-public targets. It also
shows the t-values of the differences that are statistically significant at the (*)10%, (**)5%, and (***)1% levels. All continuous variables are
winsorised at the first and 99th percentiles. Variable definitions are given in Appendix A.
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4.2 | Does leverage deviation influence
public acquisitions decisions?
This section examines over-levered firms' choice between
public and non-public acquisitions using both logit and
tobit models. Table 2 reports the average marginal effect
of logit models (Columns 1 and 2) and tobit models
(Columns 3 and 4).9 Columns 1 and 2 find that over-
levered firms are significantly more inclined to be
involved in making public acquisitions than non-public
acquisitions. These findings are significant when con-
trolled for firm characteristics, especially stock return
and MTB ratios. This provides clear evidence that the
effect of the over-levered variable is driven by neither an
TABLE 2 Over-levered firms and
the likelihood of public acquisitions
Public acquisition Public value/TA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Over-levered 0.030** 0.026** 0.003** 0.002*
(2.34) (2.00) (2.43) (1.81)
Firm size 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(8.94) (8.97) (9.07) (8.60)
MTB −0.000 −0.001 −0.000 −0.000
(−0.68) (−1.32) (−0.86) (−1.28)
ROA −0.026* −0.005 −0.003** −0.001
(−1.80) (−0.26) (−2.01) (−0.44)
Market leverage −0.087** −0.054 −0.000 −0.000
(−2.54) (−1.54) (−1.05) (−1.27)
Stock return −0.000 −0.0001 −0.009*** −0.006
(−1.50) (−1.42) (−2.96) (−1.58)
Herfindahl 0.114*** 0.093*** 0.012*** 0.011***
(6.11) (4.86) (6.10) (4.88)
Industry M&A liquidity 0.038* 0.034* 0.004** 0.004*
(1.92) (1.73) (2.08) (1.93)
Asset tangibility 0.006 0.001
(0.36) (0.48)
Liquidity 0.005*** 0.001***
(4.14) (4.04)
Firm growth 0.0002*** 0.0001***
(2.58) (2.63)
FCF −0.005* −0.0002
(−1.84) (−1.41)
Firm life cycle −0.002* −0.0003*
(−1.80) (−1.73)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,182 5.773 6,182 5.773
Note: This table reports the average marginal effects of logit analysis (Columns 1 and 2) and
tobit analysis (Columns 3 and 4). The dependent variable in the logit models takes the value
one if the firm makes a public acquisition and zero if the firm makes a non-public acquisition.
The tobit analysis estimates the ratio of the sum of the public acquisitions value to the acquirer's
total assets. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. Standard errors are robust and clustered by
firm. The estimates in the models are statistically significant at the 1(*)10%, (**)5%, and (***)1%
levels. All continuous variables are winsorised at the first and 99th percentiles. Variable defini-
tions are given in Appendix A.
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overpricing effect nor the growth opportunities of a firm.
However, it confirms the view that firms' deviation from
the target leverage specifically when over-levered is a
core determinant of firms' decisions whether to engage in
public acquisitions. The marginal effect of the over-
levered variable also shows that our results are not only
statistically significant, but also economically significant.
In particular, Column 1 reports that over-levered firms
are 3% more likely to acquire public targets, an increase
of 39.5% (0.03/public acquisition sample mean of 0.076)
over the sample average. Further, Columns 3 and 4 of
tobit analysis, which estimates the ratio of public acquisi-
tions value to the acquirer's total assets, confirm the pre-
vious results. They show that over-levered firms invest
more in public acquisitions than in non-public acquisi-
tions. Overall, these empirical findings are in line with
the premises of information economics theory that over-
levered firms may prefer public targets to avoid the
uncertainty associated with mis-evaluation of non-public
targets (Fuller et al., 2002; Officer et al., 2009). Accord-
ingly, we accept H1 that that over-levered firms are more
likely to pursue public acquisitions than non-public
acquisitions.
For the other control variables, Table 2 shows that
large firms have a higher likelihood of acquiring public
targets than non-public targets. It also shows that firms
with higher ROA are less likely to acquire public targets.
We observe that Herfindal, industry M&A variables have
a significant positive impact on firms' decisions to make
public acquisitions. We document that firms with higher
liquidity and growth are more inclined to make public
acquisitions. We find that firm life cycle variable reduces
the probability of pursuing public acquisitions.
4.3 | Does leverage deviation influence
acquirers' preference for public targets
with lower information asymmetry?
This section extends our analysis to examine whether
information asymmetry is the main motive behind over-
levered firms' preference for public targets. We run the
following logit models to test whether over-levered firms
prefer to acquire public targets with lower information
asymmetry.
Table 3 presents the average marginal effect of logit
models. Column 1 reveals that over-levered firms are
1.6% more likely to acquire large public targets. This
result supports Frankel and Li's (2004) finding that large
public firms have less risk of information asymmetry,
since they receive more coverage by the press, analysts
and the stock market than small firms do. Column 2
reports that over-levered firms have a 2.5% higher
likelihood of acquiring public targets with higher tangible
assets than the yearly average of all targets in the sample.
This confirms Karpoff et al.'s (2013) notion that acquiring
targets with higher tangible assets reduces the uncer-
tainties around the fair value of these firms. Column 3
indicates that over-levered firms have a 1.5% higher pro-
pensity to choose public targets with lower return volatil-
ity than the yearly average of all the targets in the
sample. This finding is in line with Borochin et al.'s (2019)
view that firms with lower return are less exposed to risk
of information asymmetry. Column 4 reports that over-
levered firms are 0.4% more inclined to buy public targets
with more frequently traded stocks. Our empirical results
document the fact that over-levered firms prefer not only
to pursue public acquisitions, but also to choose those
with less risk of information asymmetry. Overall, these
findings confirm the notion of information economics
theory that avoidance of risk of information asymmetry
is the main motive behind over-levered firms' preference
for public acquisitions. Accordingly, we accept H2: that
over-levered firms are more inclined to acquire public
targets with lower information asymmetry.
For the other control variables, Table 3 shows that
firm size has a positive significant influence on the likeli-
hood of making public acquisitions with lower risk of
information asymmetry. It also finds that acquirers with
higher liquidity, Herfindhal and firm growth ratios are
more inclined to acquire public targets with lower risk of
information asymmetry.
4.4 | How does the market react to over-
levered firms' announcement of public
versus non-public acquisitions?
This section investigates over-levered firms' wealth
around the announcement of public versus non-public
acquisitions. The efficient market theory states that stock
investors respond instantaneously and without bias to
news releases such as announcements of acquisitions
(Fama, 1991). Therefore, we run an event study to esti-
mate CAR using short-event windows of 3 and 5 days.
Table 4 presents coefficient estimates of acquirers'
CAR that are estimated using market models (MMs)
(Columns 1 and 2) and MAMs (Columns 3 and 4). Our
main independent variable “Over-levered× Public acqui-
sitions” shows that the market perceives public acquisi-
tion deals by over-levered firms as bad investment
decisions. Specifically, Column 1 reports that over-
levered acquirers of public targets experience a 2.2%
decline in CAR around the announcement of these acqui-
sition deals. Similarly, all the other columns (Columns 2
to 4) document that the market significantly reacts
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negatively to the announcement of public acquisitions by
over-levered firms. These findings confirm that external
investors may view announcements by over-levered firms
of public acquisitions as a decision that is inspired only by
the firms' incentive to avoid information asymmetry rather
than the incentive to maximize shareholders' wealth.
For the control variables, we find similar to Faccio
et al. (2006), that public acquisitions cause a decline in
TABLE 3 Over-levered firms and the likelihood of acquiring public targets with lower information asymmetry
Public targets with
Large size Higher fixed assets Lower return volatility More freq. Traded stocks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Over-levered 0.016* 0.025*** 0.015* 0.004*
(1.73) (3.83) (1.84) (1.76)
ROA −0.005 −0.039* −0.027 −0.006
(−0.19) (−1.82) (−1.31) (−1.60)
Firm size 0.016*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.001**
(9.59) (6.08) (6.54) (2.57)
MTB1 −0.0001 −0.0002 −0.0001 −0.0002
(−0.04) (−0.89) (−1.37) (−1.34)
Market leverage −0.032 −0.047* −0.037 −0.008
(−1.25) (−1.95) (−1.64) (−0.91)
Stock return −0.0003 −0.0003 −0.0003 −0.0002
(−0.22) (−0.58) (−0.51) (−1.35)
Herfindahl 0.073*** 0.057*** 0.024* 0.009**
(5.57) (4.24) (1.96) (2.17)
Industry M&A 0.020 0.003 0.015 0.002
Liquidity (1.62) (0.21) (1.33) (0.81)
Asset tangibility 0.004 0.068*** 0.030*** 0.002
(0.33) (5.55) (2.65) (0.36)
Liquidity 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001* 0.0001*
(3.13) (3.07) (1.92) (1.77)
Firm growth 0.0001* 0.0002* 0.001** 0.001*
(1.80) (1.84) (2.28) (1.83)
FCF −0.011 −0.0002 −0.002 −0.007*
(−0.83) (−0.02) (−0.15) (−1.80)
Firm life cycle −0.001 −0.002 −0.000 −0.0001**
(−1.04) (−0.59) (−0.46) (−2.41)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 5,596 5,596 5,596 5,596
Note: This table reports the average marginal effects of logit models. The dependent variable in column (1) takes the value one if the firm
acquires public targets with size above the sample mean per year and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in column (2) takes the value
one if the firm acquires public targets that have tangible assets above the sample mean per year and zero otherwise. The dependent variable
in column (3) takes the value one if the firm acquires public targets with return volatility below the sample mean per year and zero other-
wise. The dependent variable in column (4) takes the value one if the firm acquires public targets with ratio of absolute value of daily stock
return to daily trading volume over the year prior to the acquisition announcement that lies below the sample mean per year and zero other-
wise. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. Standard errors are robust and clustered by firm. The estimates in the models are statistically
significant at the 1(*)10%, (**)5%, and (***)1% levels. All continuous variables are winsorised at the first and 99th percentiles. Variable defini-
tions are given in Appendix A.
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TABLE 4 Over-levered firms' wealth around the announcement of public acquisitions
CARMM (−1,+1) CARMM (−2,+2) CARMAM (−1,+1) CARMAM (−2,+2)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Over-levered −0.003 −0.004 −0.0003 −0.003
(−0.89) (−0.93) (−0.06) (−0.62)
Over-levered × public acquisitions −0.022** −0.033** −0.027** −0.031**
(−2.18) (−2.53) (−2.17) (−2.30)
Firm size −0.003*** −0.003*** −0.003*** −0.004***
(−4.96) (−3.41) (−4.36) (−4.02)
MTB −0.0002 −0.0002 −0.0001 −0.0001
(−0.98) (−1.42) (−1.54) (−1.26)
ROA 0.005 −0.008 −0.011 −0.004
(0.69) (−0.35) (−0.54) (−0.20)
Market leverage 0.004 0.010 0.011 0.018
(0.38) (0.57) (0.73) (1.15)
Stock return −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0002 −0.0002
(−0.15) (−1.10) (−0.85) (−0.95)
Herfindahl −0.003 0.054 0.056 0.071
(−0.14) (0.87) (0.96) (1.16)
Industry M&A liquidity −0.001 −0.003 −0.004 −0.007
(−0.13) (−0.32) (−0.45) (−0.76)
Asset tangibility 0.004 0.010 0.004 0.007
(0.83) (1.17) (0.52) (0.79)
Liquidity −0.001 −0.002 −0.002** −0.002*
(−1.42) (−1.57) (−2.43) (−1.94)
Firm growth −0.0002*** −0.0001*** −0.0002*** −0.0001***
(−5.52) (−3.11) (−5.35) (−3.67)
FCF 0.001 0.001 0.004** 0.001
(1.05) (0.28) (2.14) (0.35)
Firm life cycle −0.000 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(−0.69) (−0.87) (−0.70) (−0.81)
Public acquisitions −0.018*** −0.022*** −0.023*** −0.022***
(−4.07) (−3.81) (−4.38) (−3.82)
Deal relative size 0.006 0.009 0.017** 0.014
(1.27) (1.07) (2.24) (1.64)
Competed deals 0.006 0.015 0.012 0.019*
(0.66) (1.39) (1.12) (1.66)
Hostile deals −0.046* −0.038 −0.046 −0.044
(−1.90) (−1.18) (−1.64) (−1.26)
Pure cash deals 0.004** 0.006** 0.004** 0.006**
(2.23) (2.53) (2.14) (2.45)
Pure stock deals 0.006 0.016 0.014 0.014
(1.08) (1.47) (1.35) (1.33)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
(Continues)
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the acquirers' stock returns around the announcement of
these deals. Consistent with the hubris hypothesis, large
firms may undertake acquisitions due to overconfidence
in their ability rather than the prospect of economic gain
from these acquisitions (Roll, 1986; Moeller et al., 2004).
Thus, we find that large firms experience a negative reac-
tion around the announcement of acquisition deals. Fol-
lowing the view that cash acquisitions feed a positive
signal to the market about the expected future gains from
acquisition deals (Fuller et al., 2002), we find that stock
investors respond in favour of pure cash acquisition
deals. Table 4 shows that firms with a high growth rate
face poor CAR around the announcement of acquisition
transactions.
4.5 | Do public acquisitions influence
the long-term performance of over-levered
firms'?
This section investigates operating synergies of over-
levered acquirers of public targets to test whether the
market reaction observed in the previous section still
holds in the long run. In particular, it examines changes
in the operating performance of over-levered firms in
3 years' post and pre the effective year of public
acquisitions.
Table 5 presents the regression analysis of ROA
changes after undertaking both public and non-public
targets. Using the interaction variable, Column 1 finds
that over-levered firms that make public acquisitions
experience significant positive changes in ROA. Column
2, after controlling for deal characteristics, shows a signif-
icant improvement in the operating performance of over-
levered acquirers of public targets. Accordingly, we
accept H4 that public acquisitions have a significant posi-
tive effect on the long-term performance of over-levered
firms. These findings support the premises of agency the-
ory and Uysal's (2011) view that over-levered firms are
more likely to be selective and to choose the most value-
enhancing public acquisition deals due to the high pres-
sure of holding high levels of debt. Our empirical findings
also suggest that the previous section's negative market
reaction around the announcement of public acquisitions
by over-levered firms may be biased and such acquirers
experience better long-term operating synergies.
For the control variables, we find that the coefficient
of the over-levered variable that accounts for over-levered
acquirers of non-public targets is insignificant. This may
confirm that over-levered acquirers of public firms out-
perform those who acquire non-public targets. According
to the hubris effect, we find that large firms experience
negative changes in ROA after making M&A deals.
Table 5 shows that liquidity ratio and firms' life cycle var-
iables have negative association with the changes in ROA
after M&A transactions. It provides evidence that firms
with high stock returns experience better operation syn-
ergies after completing their acquisition decisions. From
deal characteristics, Table 5 documents that firms which
have made hostile deals experience negative long-term
operating performance. It documents that pure cash
acquisitions have long-term operating gains. This sup-
ports our empirical market reaction results in the previ-
ous section that pure cash acquisitions feed a positive
signal to the market.
4.6 | Do public acquisitions influence
over-levered firms' long-term value?
This section explores the economic consequences of pub-
lic acquisitions when they are made by over-levered
firms. In particular, it gauges the changes in Tobin's q of
over-levered firms in 3 years' post and pre the effective
year of public and non-public acquisitions.
Table 6 presents the regression analysis of changes in
Tobin's q after making an acquisition. The coefficient of
the interaction between over-levered and public
TABLE 4 (Continued)
CARMM (−1,+1) CARMM (−2,+2) CARMAM (−1,+1) CARMAM (−2,+2)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
R2 0.043 0.037 0.051 0.039
N 5,489 5,489 5,489 5,489
Note: This table reports the coefficient estimates of acquirers' cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) which are estimated using market models
(columns 1 and 2) and market adjusted models (columns 3 and 4). CARs are calculated over a 3-day event window (from 1 day before to
1 day after the announcement date) and over a 5-day event window (2 days before and 2 days after the announcement date). The benchmark
return is the FTSE all shares index of UK quoted firms. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. Standard errors are robust and clustered by
firm. The estimates in the models are statistically significant at the 1(*)10%, (**)5%, and (***)1% levels. All continuous variables are
winsorised at the first and 99th percentiles. Variable definitions are given in Appendix A.
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acquisitions in Column 1 reveals that over-levered firms
experience significant positive changes in Tobin's q after
pursuing public acquisitions. This finding suggests that
the previous section's observed operating synergy of pub-
lic acquisitions on over-levered firms may be the reason
behind the enhanced value of these firms. Column 2,
after controlling for deal characteristics, shows that the
coefficients of the “public acquisitions” variable is nega-
tive and significant, which prove that public acquisition
deals in general are wealth-loss decisions. However, the
coefficient of the “over-levered × public acquisitions”
variable is positive and significant, confirming that public
acquisitions by over-levered firms are wealth maximizing
investment decisions. These findings are in line with
Uysal's (2011) view that over-levered firms which are
more heavily committed to future interest and principal
payments are more likely to be involved in wealth-
gaining acquisition decisions. Collectively, the effect of
public acquisition deals on over-levered firms' long-term
value does not support the negative market reaction
around these decisions noted in Section 4.4. However, we
accept H5 that in the long run public acquisitions are
value-creating decisions for over-levered firms.
5 | ROBUSTNESS
5.1 | Propensity score matching to
address endogeneity concerns
Testing the effect of public acquisitions on over-levered
firms' long-term performance and value using the OLS
method may entail a self-selection bias. Specifically, a
potential bias from using this method is that a firm's deci-
sion to choose between public and non-public acquisi-
tions is unlikely to be exogenous. To address possible
TABLE 5 Effect of public acquisitions in the long-term
performance of over-levered firms
ΔROA
(1) (2)
Over-levered 0.002 0.002
(0.20) (0.15)
Over-levered × public acquisitions 0.061** 0.070**
(2.01) (2.31)
Firm size −0.009*** −0.010***
(−5.87) (−6.43)
MTB −0.001 −0.001
(−1.48) (−1.48)
ROA −0.078*** −0.083***
(−3.32) (−3.39)
Market leverage 0.043* 0.046*
(1.69) (1.78)
Stock return 0.0003*** 0.0003***
(7.00) (7.09)
Herfindahl 0.035** 0.037**
(2.01) (2.12)
Industry M&A liquidity −0.075 −0.077
(−0.84) (−0.87)
Asset tangibility −0.018 −0.024*
(−1.31) (−1.70)
Liquidity −0.005*** −0.006***
(−2.87) (−3.00)
Firm growth 0.0003 0.0003
(0.83) (0.93)
FCF −0.0002 −0.0002
(−0.01) (−0.12)
Firm life cycle −0.005*** −0.005***
(−4.46) (−4.45)
Public acquisitions −0.010 −0.006
(−0.97) (−0.58)
Deal relative size −0.0001
(−0.18)
Competed deals 0.025
(0.83)
Hostile deals −0.125**
(−1.96)
Pure cash deals 0.013**
(2.49)
Pure stock deals −0.018
(−1.41)
Year FE Yes Yes
(Continues)
TABLE 5 (Continued)
ΔROA
(1) (2)
Industry FE Yes Yes
R2 0.116 0.119
N 3,279 3,279
Note: This table reports the coefficient estimates of OLS analyses
using public and non-public M&A sample. The dependent variable
is ROA 3 years after the effective year of an acquisition minus ROA
3 years before the effective year of an acquisition. T-statistics are
reported in parenthesis. Standard errors are robust and clustered by
firm. The estimates in the models are statistically significant at the
1(*)10%, (**)5%, and (***)1% levels. All continuous variables are
winsorised at the first and 99th percentiles. Variable definitions are
given in Appendix A.
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endogeneity concerns, we use PSM by constructing a sub-
sample of public acquirers (the treatment group) that is
matched to a sample of non-acquirers (the control group)
(Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983; Saunders & Steffen, 2011).
In particular, we calculate each observation's propensity
score using a logit model that predicted the likelihood of
public acquisition (the likelihood of being treated) as a
function of firm-level characteristics (over-levered, firms
size, ROA, MTB and market leverage).10 Second, each
public acquirer is matched with non-acquiring firms that
have the closest propensity score to the treated firm. We
employ three matching techniques, namely, the 5 nearest
neighbours, Caliper and kernel (Minton, Taillard, &
Williamson, 2014).11 We apply these matching methods
with replacements, which means that a single non-
acquirer can match more than one public acquirer. We
employ the common support to exclude the extreme
boundaries by dropping non-acquirers in the control
group whose propensity score is higher than the maxi-
mum or lower than the minimum propensity score
among public acquirers in the treatment group and vice
versa (Harris & O'Brien, 2018).
Table 7 presents results of assessing effect of public
acquisitions on over-levered firms' long-term perfor-
mance and value, using a multivariate propensity score
methodology. In Columns 1 and 4, we match treated and
control firms using the 5 nearest neighbours. Following
Simintzi, Vig, and Volpin (2015), in Columns 2 and 4, we
select the control group within a predefined propensity
score distance with a caliper of 0.001.12 In Columns 3
and 6, we adopt the kernel matching estimator.13
Columns 1 to 3 confirm our previous results that
over-levered acquirers of public targets experience signifi-
cant improvement in their operating performance after
addressing selection bias concerns. Column 3 shows that
TABLE 6 Effect of public acquisitions in the long-term value
of over-levered firms
ΔTobin's q
(1) (2)
Over-levered 0.098 0.130
(0.14) (0.19)
Over-levered × public acquisitions 1.496* 1.678*
(1.82) (1.71)
Firm size −0.016 −0.029
(−0.09) (−0.14)
MTB −0.061 −0.061
(−1.24) (−1.24)
ROA 0.858 0.591
(0.16) (0.13)
Market leverage −1.374 −1.422
(−0.94) (−1.05)
Stock return 0.010*** 0.010***
(3.43) (3.02)
Herfindahl −1.116 −1.067
(−1.15) (−1.08)
Industry M&A liquidity −0.998 −1.138
(−0.12) (−0.13)
Asset tangibility 0.338 0.345
(0.39) (0.39)
Liquidity −0.229 −0.228
(−0.83) (−0.83)
Firm growth 0.0003 0.002
(−0.02) (0.12)
FCF −0.179 −0.182
(−0.60) (−0.55)
Firm life cycle −0.054 −0.054
(−0.37) (−0.37)
Public acquisitions −0.931*** −0.840**
(−3.02) (−2.18)
Deal relative size −0.078
(−0.09)
Competed deals 0.467
(1.03)
Hostile deals 1.139
(1.63)
Pure cash deals −0.174
(−0.68)
Pure stock deals −0.730
(−0.58)
Year FE Yes Yes
TABLE 6 (Continued)
ΔTobin's q
(1) (2)
Industry FE Yes Yes
R2 0.021 0.021
N 3,008 3,008
Note: This table reports the coefficient estimates of OLS analyses
using public and non-public M&A sample. The dependent variable
is Tobin's q 3 years after the effective year of an acquisition minus
Tobin's q 3 years before the effective year of an acquisition. T-statis-
tics are reported in parenthesis. Standard errors are robust and clus-
tered by firm. The estimates in the models are statistically
significant at the 1(*)10%, (**)5%, and (***)1% levels. All continuous
variables are winsorised at the first and 99th percentiles. Variable
definitions are given in Appendix A.
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the coefficient of the over-levered variable that account
for non-acquiring of over-levered firms is positive and
significant. However, comparing coefficients of both the
“over-levered” variable and the “over-levered× public
acquisitions” variable leads to the conclusion that over-
levered acquirers of public firms outperform non-
TABLE 7 Effect of public acquisitions on over-levered firms' performance and value using PSM
ΔROA ΔTobin's q
5-neighbours (1) Caliper (2) Kernel (3) 5-neighbours (4) Caliper (5) Kernel (6)
Over-levered 0.009 0.008 0.020*** −0.095 −0.107 0.246***
(0.55) (0.52) (3.57) (−0.49) (−0.54) (2.67)
Over-levered × public acquisitions 0.099** 0.097** 0.073** 0.862*** 0.831*** 0.414*
(2.58) (2.55) (2.21) (3.04) (2.94) (1.65)
Firm size −0.001 −0.001 −0.005*** −0.068* −0.063* −0.024
(−0.51) (−0.60) (−5.90) (−1.79) (−1.66) (−1.12)
MTB −0.0002 −0.0002 −0.002*** −0.003 −0.005 −0.226***
(−0.35) (−0.37) (−3.54) (−0.03) (−0.05) (−4.80)
ROA −0.044 −0.045 −0.010 −0.620 −0.613 −1.712***
(−0.79) (−0.81) (−0.76) (−0.61) (−0.60) (−6.47)
Market leverage 0.005 0.009 0.006 −1.642*** −1.586*** −0.719**
(0.14) (0.22) (0.40) (−2.87) (−2.77) (−2.28)
Stock return 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.0001*** 0.001 0.002 0.004***
(5.25) (5.24) (12.81) (1.03) (1.14) (5.75)
Herfindahl −0.031 −0.032 0.015 0.926 0.858 0.786
(−1.12) (−1.13) (1.33) (0.52) (0.48) (1.14)
Industry M&A liquidity 0.007 −0.004 0.125** −1.235 −1.646* −1.234***
(0.04) (−0.02) (2.08) (−1.40) (−1.90) (−3.03)
Asset tangibility 0.010 0.011 −0.002 0.680** 0.667** 0.028
(0.50) (0.53) (−0.29) (2.33) (2.29) (0.16)
Liquidity 0.002 0.002 −0.002** −0.033 −0.033 −0.019
(0.74) (0.76) (−2.01) (−1.07) (−1.05) (−1.43)
Firm growth 0.0001 0.0001 0.0005*** 0.003** 0.003* 0.002***
(0.00) (0.01) (3.72) (1.99) (1.94) (2.73)
FCF 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.010*** 0.322 0.274 0.619***
(2.72) (2.71) (5.66) (0.90) (0.77) (3.13)
Firm life cycle −0.004* −0.004* −0.004*** −0.037 −0.037 −0.006
(−1.73) (−1.72) (−5.91) (−1.02) (−1.01) (−0.42)
Public acquisitions 0.000 0.002 −0.001 −0.506*** −0.478*** −0.390**
(0.03) (0.13) (−0.07) (−3.25) (−3.11) (−2.50)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.125 0.126 0.090 0.150 0.153 0.118
N 1,638 1,628 17,558 1,569 1,559 16,725
Note: This table reports the coefficient estimates of OLS analyses using matched propensity scores sample of public acquiring firms and non-
acquiring firms. The dependent variables are changes in ROA (Columns 1, 2, and 3) and changes in Tobin's q (Columns 4, 5, and 6). T-statis-
tics are reported in parenthesis. Standard errors are robust and clustered by firm. The estimates in the models are statistically significant at
the 1(*)10%, (**)5%, and (***)1% levels. All continuous variables are winsorised at the first and 99th percentiles. Variable definitions are given
in Appendix A.
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TABLE 8 Long-term outcomes of public acquisitions on over-levered firms' performance and value after controlling for self-
selection bias
ΔROA ΔTobin's q
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Over-levered 0.001 0.002 0.071 0.121
(0.06) (0.12) (0.12) (0.21)
Over-levered × public acquisitions 0.061* 0.072** 1.494* 1.565*
(1.84) (2.36) (1.76) (1.80)
Firm size −0.001 −0.002 −0.083 −0.062
(−0.09) (−0.24) (−0.13) (−0.09)
MTB −0.002 −0.002 −0.075 −0.071
(−1.38) (−1.46) (−0.78) (−0.74)
ROA −0.078* −0.086* 0.889 0.909
(−1.68) (−1.81) (0.17) (0.20)
Market leverage 0.039 0.040 −1.482 −1.426
(0.92) (0.94) (−0.95) (−1.01)
Stock return 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.013 0.012
(2.80) (3.03) (0.89) (0.80)
Herfindahl 0.036 0.038 −1.108 −1.094
(1.32) (1.41) (−1.11) (−1.06)
Industry M&A liquidity 0.061 0.069 −0.561 −0.155
(0.37) (0.42) (−0.04) (−0.01)
Asset tangibility −0.015 −0.020 0.381 0.370
(−0.80) (−1.09) (0.40) (0.37)
Liquidity −0.004 −0.004 −0.213 −0.217
(−1.32) (−1.37) (−0.67) (−0.67)
Firm growth 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.53) (0.63) (0.10) (0.06)
FCF −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.192 −0.179
(−0.03) (−0.02) (−0.64) (−0.52)
Firm life cycle −0.004** −0.004** −0.054 −0.056
(−2.47) (−2.43) (−0.37) (−0.38)
Public acquisitions −0.009 −0.004 −0.919*** −0.910*
(−0.80) (−0.38) (−3.10) (−1.95)
Deal relative size −0.009 −0.378
(−0.45) (−0.13)
Competed deals 0.029 0.441
(0.83) (1.05)
Hostile deals −0.124* 1.234*
(−1.68) (1.74)
Pure cash deals 0.013** −0.155
(2.21) (−0.64)
Pure stock deals −0.016 −0.738
(−0.79) (−0.56)
Inverse-Mills ratio 0.311 0.336 3.753 2.504
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acquirers' matched counterparts. Columns 4 to 6 find that
over-levered acquirers of public targets maximize their
values, after accounting for endogeneity concerns using PSM.
5.2 | Heckman two-step procedure to
address self-selection bias
Arguably, if unobserved factors that influence the selection
of either public or non-public acquisitions also affects the
long-term outcomes of these acquisitions, then the coefficient
estimated on the interaction term between over-levered and
public acquisitions in Tables 5 and 6 may be biased. Follow-
ing Borochin et al. (2019), we employ Heckman (1979) two-
step estimation method to correct for self-selection bias aris-
ing from the fact that the choice between public and non-
public acquisition is a managers' decision rather than a ran-
dom choice. In the first step, we run a probit model of the
likelihood of public acquisitions using the same variables as
in Equation (1) of Section 3.3. In the second step, we estimate
the inverse Mills ratio from the probit model in the first step
and then employ it as an additional explanatory variable to
test the effect of public acquisitions on performance of over-
levered firms' and value, using our M&A sample. Table 8
presents the results using Heckman's two-step self-selection
correction model. It finds similar to our previous results that
public acquisitions enhance the long-term performance and
values of over-levered firms', and hence this finding is not
sensitive to self-selection bias.
6 | CONCLUSION
Previous work by Uysal (2011) investigates how devia-
tions from target leverage affect the likelihood of making
acquisitions. This paper goes further and explores the
effect of leverage deviation on a firm's choice between
public and non-public acquisitions. According to infor-
mation economics, over-levered firms should avoid the
uncertainty risk arising from the information asymmetry
of non-public targets. Lending support to this theory, the
results of the present paper reveal that over-levered firms
tend to engage in public acquisitions. The paper further
documents the view that searching for targets with better
available information can be one of the motives of over-
levered firms' preference for public acquisitions. To the
best of our knowledge, this paper is one of the first to
provide interesting evidence that UK firms significantly
consider their target leverage when they decide the type
of acquisition to undertake.
This paper further explores the economic gains and
operating synergies of public versus non-public acquisi-
tions when carried out by over-levered firms. It reveals,
using short event windows, that the market perceives the
announcement of public acquisitions by over-levered
firms as decisions that lose wealth. However, testing the
effect of these deals on over-levered acquirers' long-term
performance and values reveals that public acquisitions
trigger better operating synergies and value for these
firms. In summary, our empirical findings imply that the
position of any deviation from target leverage has essen-
tial implications for firms' acquisition policies. The paper
finds that leverage deviation affects the type, value and
performance of the chosen acquisition. In practise, our
paper sheds light on the importance of addressing hetero-
geneity in firms' leverage deviations before making acqui-
sition decision in order to involve in successful deals.
ORCID
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TABLE 8 (Continued)
ΔROA ΔTobin's q
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(1.35) (1.52) (0.20) (0.14)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.116 0.120 0.021 0.021
N 3,279 3,279 3,008 3,008
Note: This table reportse the coefficient estimates of OLS analyses after controlling for self-selection bias using Inverse Mills ratio estimated
by Heckman two-stages method. The dependent variable in (Columns 1 and 2) is ROA 3 years after the effective year of an acquisition minus
ROA 3 years before the effective year of an acquisition. The dependent variable in (Columns 3 and 4) is Tobin's q 3 years after the effective
year of an acquisition minus Tobin's q 3 years before the effective year of an acquisition. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. Standard
errors are robust and clustered by firm. The estimates in the models are statistically significant at the 1(*)10%, (**)5%, and (***)1% levels. All
continuous variables are winsorised at the first and 99th percentiles. Variable definitions are given in Appendix A.
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ENDNOTES
1 Graham and Harvey (2001) report that 55% of large US firms have
strict leverage targets. Beattie, Goodacre, and Thomson (2006)
provide survey evidence from UK public firms that 50% of finance
directors seek to keep their leverage level on target. Using a com-
prehensive survey of managers of 16 European countries, Bancel
and Mittoo (2004) find that 59% of respondents confirm the
importance of maintaining a target debt to equity ratio.
2 Leverage deviation is defined as actual market leverage ratio
minus target leverage ratio. Over-levered firms are those with
leverage deviation in the highest quintile (Hovakimian, Opler, &
Titman, 2001).
3 The choice of our context is attributable to the fact that the UK is
a key player in the world's M&A market, surpassing all other
European Union (EU) countries (Sudarsanam, 2003). In terms of
economic importance, investments in domestic acquisition deals
represented around 8.5 and 2.4% of the UK's gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) in 2000 and 2008, respectively (Office for National Sta-
tistics [ONS], 2013). Furthermore, the reported total value for
M&A transactions during Quarter 1 of 2016 was £49.4 billion, the
highest value reported since Quarter 2 of 2007 (ONS, 2016). The
distinction between non-public and public acquisitions is a key
since such deals are quite pervasive and represent approximately
92% of the total volume of UK domestic acquisitions during our
sample period.
4 We obtain consistent results when we exclude foreign acquisition
deals from our sample.
5 Our data are collected from the Eikon database using a list of both
“live” and “dead” UK non-financial firms, in order to avoid survi-
vorship bias.
6 Previous UK studies (i.e., Dang, 2013; Ozkan, 2001) exclude R&D
and selling expenses variables when estimating firms' target lever-
age. For example, Hovakimian et al. (2001) argue that the MTB
variable can capture the same effect of both R&D and selling
expense variables. In an unreported table, we exclude these vari-
ables to re-estimate leverage deviation and an over-levered proxy.
Then if we test our hypotheses, we still obtain similar results.
7 Aw and Chatterjee (2004) advocate that it is essential to include
days before the event in order to take into account any leakages
of information into the market. Similarly, including days after the
event is recommended to capture any delays or frictions in the
price adjustment process by stock investors due to the time
needed by them to fully grasp the impact of the deal (Amewu &
Alagidede, 2018). Arnold and Parker (2007) confirm that
employing a three-day event window minimizes the likelihood of
encompassing abnormal returns arising from events unrelated to
the acquisition itself. While, Fuller et al. (2002) confirm that
employing 5-day event window capture most of the acquisition
impact.
8 We get consistent results when we run Equations (4) and (5)
using non-overlapping acquisitions data in which a firm is not
involved in an acquisition within 3 years of a previous
acquisition.
9 We report the average marginal effects, since it is difficult to inter-
pret the coefficient estimates of logit and tobit models and to
assess the economic significance of our findings. We add more
control variables in Columns 2 and 4.
10 In an unreported table, we predict the control group using our
logit model in Equation (1) that includes over-levered, firm size,
MTB, ROA, stock return, asset tangibility, liquidity, sales growth,
FCF, firm life cycle, market leverage, Herfindhal index, industry
M&A liquidity, industry fixed effect and year. We also try to
replace the over-levered variable by a leverage deviation variable
and still get consistent results.
11 We obtain consistent results when applying the nearest neigh-
bour matching method without replacement by selecting one
non-acquirer that has the closest propensity score for each public
acquirer and also when we match with the 4 nearest neighbours.
12 We also apply a caliper of 0.01 to define the propensity score dis-
tance and still get qualitatively similar findings.
13 We report a Gaussian kernel estimator and we get consistent
results when trying the Epanechikov kernel matching estimator
and local linear regression matching.
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APPENDIX A: DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES
Variable Definition
Asset tangibility Net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets.
CARMAR (−1, 1) & (−2, +2) Cumulative abnormal returns estimated using the market adjusted model. The benchmark return
is the UK FTSE all shares index on date t. CARs are calculated over a 3-day event window (from
1 day before to 1 day after the announcement date) and over a 5-day event window (2 days
before and 2 days after the announcement date).
CARMM (−1, +1) & (−2, +2) Cumulative abnormal returns estimated using market model. The benchmark return is the UK
FTSE all shares index on date t. market model parameters are estimated over the 255-day
window ending 46 trading days before the announcement. CARs are calculated over a 3-day
event window (from 1 day before to 1 day after the announcement date) and over a 5-day event
window (2 days before and 2 days after the announcement date).
Δ ROA The difference between the average ROA 3 years after the deal (t + 1, t + 3) and the average
3 years ROA prior to the deal (t − 3 to t − 1), where t is the effective year of a completed M&A
deal.
Δ Tobin's q The difference between the average Tobin's q 3 years after the deal (t + 1, t + 3) and the average
3 years Tobin's q prior to the deal (t − 3 to t − 1), where t is the effective year of a completed
M&A deal. Tobin's q equals (market value of equity + book value of liabilities)/(book value of
equity + book value of liabilities).
Competed deals Takes a value of one if there is more than one bidder and zero otherwise.
Deal relative size Natural logarithm of the ratio of deal value to the acquirers' total assets prior to the
announcement date.
FCF Free cash flow ratio is (net operating cash flow – Cash dividends – Capital expenditures)/ total
assets.
Firm growth Sales growth rate the equal natural logarithm of (Salesi,t/Salei,t−1)t
Firm life cycle Retained earnings divided by common shareholders' equity
Firm size The natural logarithm of sales.
Herfindahl The sum of the square of sales of a firm divided by the sum of sales of all firms sharing the same
three-digit SIC.
Hostile deals Takes a value of one if the deal is a hostile acquisition and zero otherwise.
Industry M&A Liquidity Total acquisition value for each year and three-digit SIC code, scaled by total assets of all UK firms
that share the same year and three-digit SIC.
Leverage deviation Actual market leverage ratio minus target leverage ratio.
Liquidity Current assets over current liabilities.
Market leverage Total debt divided by the sum of total debt plus market-value of equity.
MTB Market value over book value of total assets.
NDTS Non-debt tax shields ratio is annual depreciation expenses over total assets.
Over-levered Takes a value of one if the firm falls in the highest quintile for leverage deviation and zero
otherwise.
Over-levered × public acquisitions An interaction term between over-levered firm and public acquisitions.
Public acquisition Takes a value of one if the firm makes a public acquisition and zero if it makes a non-public
acquisition.
Public value/TA Ratio of public deals value to the acquirers' total assets.
Pure cash deals Takes a value of one if the whole acquisition transaction is paid with cash only and zero
otherwise.
Pure stock deals Takes a value of one if the whole acquisition transaction is paid with stock only and zero
otherwise.
R&D expenses/total assets The ratio of research and development expenses over total assets.
(Continues)
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APPENDIX B: TARGET MARKET LEVERAGE
ESTIMATION MODEL Note: This table shows the time series means of coeffi-
cient estimates of yearly-industry regressions to predict
target market leverage using UK data from 1984 to 2019.
The dependent variable market leverage equals total
debt/ (total debt plus market value of equity). T-statistics
are reported in parenthesis. Standard errors are robust
and clustered by firm. The estimates in the models are
statistically significant at the 1(*)10%, (**)5%, and (***)1%
levels. All continuous variables are winsorised at the first
and 99th percentiles. Variable definitions are given in
Appendix A.
Variable Definition
R&D missing Takes a value of one for missing R&D data and zero otherwise
ROA Income before extraordinary item divided by total assets.
Selling expenses/sales The ratio of selling expenses over sales.
Stock return Compounded total stock returns 1 year prior to a firm's fiscal year end.
Sum public acquisition/TA Ratio of the sum of public acquisition value to the acquirer's total assets.
Market leverage
Firm size 0.008***
(18.38)
MTB −0.010***
(−19.28)
ROA −0.387***
(−17.34)
Asset tangibility 0.135***
(27.65)
Liquidity −0.036***
(−20.44)
NDTS −0.517***
(−9.57)
R&D expenses/total assets −0.227***
(−10.30)
R&D missing 0.019***
(3.93)
Selling expenses/sales −0.025
(1.59)
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